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To be useful in informing environmental manage-
ment decisions, ecological risk assessments (ERAs) need 
to be expressed in value-relevant terms (USEPA 2009). 
Making decisions about accepting more or less ecolog-
ical resources for more or less economic and social gain 
depends upon public values. ERAs have been criticized 
for not delivering value-relevant results and for there-
fore not being useful as a basis for management de-
cisions (Gibbs 2010). We agree that ERAs need to be 
value-relevant, but we also must be explicit about what 
constitutes science and what constitutes values in this 
process. In a recent editorial, Backhaus et al. (2010) dis-
cuss the pressures faced by scientists to mix science with 
values when performing risk assessments and stress the 
importance of resisting the allure of so-called normative 
science. We strongly support this view. Public values 
are not a part of science, and the values of scientists do 
not necessarily reflect the values of the public. Here we 
elaborate on these two good reasons for keeping science 
and values separate in environmental decision making.
First, science ideally should strive to separate under-
standing from values. Hypotheses are based on judg-
ments about how we think the natural world works; 
but the key to science is that these ideas, or hunches, are 
confronted with carefully collected evidence from con-
trived and controlled situations that, at least in princi-
ple, are open to checking and repetition by others. The 
history of science is littered with hypotheses that turned 
out to be wrong or, if not entirely wrong, were not quite 
right either. This is why the scientific process seeks to 
be as rigorous as possible before accepting hypotheses. 
No doubt the collection of the evidence will be based on 
judgment and bias (Jasanoff 1990), but the basis of the 
scientific approach is not to find that acceptable; rather, 
it is to continually seek to do better through a transpar-
ent process of scientific communication involving peer 
review.
A widespread misconception is that the outputs of 
science can be treated as if they were certain when de-
veloping policy. Understanding environmental prob-
lems often involves substantial uncertainties and causal 
linkages that are enormously complex and not as well 
understood as they should be. That said, science has 
delivered spectacularly in terms of visits to the moon, 
health care, technology that unburdens our lives, and so 
on; and the basis of this success, in no matter which sci-
entific discipline, whether astrophysics or ecology, is the 
reliance on evidence rather than on untested hunches.
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One response to perceived limitations of the scien-
tific approach is to explicitly mix evidence-based sci-
ence and public values in the so-called development of 
postnormal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990), and 
some even argue that postnormal approaches should 
play a key role in training environmental science stu-
dents for the future (Biggs et al. 2010). Postnormal sci-
ence has been advocated for deployment when facts 
are uncertain, stakes high, and decisions urgent. This 
is manifest in various forms, but a central theme is that 
the decisions should be based on a dialogue involving 
an extended community of stakeholders, not just sci-
entists, that bring their own understanding and values 
into the decision; these are surely the kinds of forums 
that should be welcome in making decisions. Our con-
cern is not with the process but with what the process is 
called. To label it as science—even if it is postnormal—is 
to misunderstand the process of science and potentially 
undermine what it brings to decision making.
A second reason for maintaining the separation of 
science and values is to guard against scientists’ val-
ues dominating policy making. The separation of the 
judgments of scientists from the evidence-based under-
standing that they generate is not always understood 
by the public and decision makers. The problem is that 
collecting scientific evidence in the face of complexity 
and uncertainty can be extremely difficult and frustrat-
ingly slow; yet the needs of the decision makers are of-
ten urgent. The temptation is to take short cuts—to base 
the decision on less, and less rigorously collected, evi-
dence—and in these very complex circumstances to 
base decisions on the views of the scientists rather than 
on the outputs of a thorough, evidence-based process.
This is an aspect of making decisions based on the 
precautionary principle. Given the enormity of some 
of the problems being faced in making decisions about 
complex environmental issues, it is surely legitimate 
that decision makers sometimes adopt a precaution-
ary approach in the face of so much uncertainty. The 
key point is that this needs to be done clearly, recogniz-
ing that the decisions so made are, by definition, based 
more on judgment than on evidence, and that as such 
they may turn out to be wrong and thus bring costs 
without benefits. A literature is developing that is de-
signed to bring comfort on this point, giving examples 
of cases where, if the precautionary principle had been 
applied, the right decisions would have been made (e.g., 
Harremoës et al. 2001); but this is almost bound to be a 
biased sample because activities and processes deemed 
to be bad on the basis of the precautionary principle will 
often be stopped or excluded so that no chance arises to 
follow up and demonstrate a mistake. Precaution will 
therefore be an inevitable part of environmental pol-
icy and decisions; however, our point is that it should 
be applied knowingly and transparently, because oth-
erwise it can confuse judgments with evidence-based 
understanding.
In our view, the best decisions about environmental 
issues will involve value judgments about public pref-
erences for economic, social, and ecological capital in-
formed by evidence-based science. As such, scientists 
should be measuring risks on entities that are valued. 
However, making ERAs value-relevant does not mean 
mixing values and science.
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